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Introduction   
Everyone is familiar with war, threats, and other hard power strategies that countries 
pursue to get what they want. Hard power strategies are obvious when bullets and missiles are 
fired, but it is far more difficult to understand how countries garner support without using 
weapons. Military power is of course important in maintaining and advancing a country’s global 
political position but is not the only way a country can hold influence. This paper will look at a 
different kind of foreign policy strategy, the use of soft power in frozen conflict zones. 
Specifically, this paper will identify, analyze, and evaluate the use of Russian soft power in the 
breakaway regions of Ukraine and Georgia: Donbass (or Eastern Ukraine)1, Abkhazia, and South 
Ossetia. This senior thesis will argue that Russian soft power has been effective in achieving its 
strategic goals by actively opposing another nation’s soft power.  
Russia is not the only nation employing soft power. Georgia and Ukraine are also 
engaging in the practice to further their own political agendas. It is relatively clear that Russia 
has the upper hand in military engagements, but the real battle for international position is in the 
soft power realm where Russia is vying for the hearts and minds of people in the breakaway 
regions. Likewise, Ukraine and Georgia are employing as many resources as possible to 
reestablish control of the regions in a way that reinforces their territorial integrity and makes 
them attractive partners in international organizations like the European Union (EU) and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
A big question to ask is, “Why should Russia care about these small regions in relatively 
weaker countries?” Russia is using these frozen conflicts to keep the so-called “pot boiling." As 
a former superpower attempting a comeback, Russia is looking to re-establish control in its 
historical sphere of influence. The ultimate goal is to halt NATO and EU expansion and regain 																																																								
1 This paper will use the terms interchangeably.  
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political and cultural clout. By destabilizing these regions, Russia can ensure its relevancy to 
international decision-making and keep Western influence from extending closer to its borders. 
While a strategy for creating and sustaining frozen conflicts is beneficial to Russia in a number 
of ways, pushing too far can hurt its geopolitical position. Russia risks souring relations with the 
West as well as the breakaway regions. Furthermore, destabilizing neighboring countries is, in 
general, a significant security risk, requiring resources and physical manpower to keep threats 
under control. Russia has had to commit a number of troops to maintaining positions in each 
region, but this hard power aspect will not be explored in this paper. The focus of this paper will 
remain on soft power strategies, and how they can be employed effectively in these cases. 
 
I. Soft Power Background  
The first step in analyzing Russia’s soft power strategy is to develop an understanding of 
the term “soft power.” As my advisor so eloquently said once, soft power is not only the ability 
of State A to get State B to do what it wants, but also its ability to make State B like it. Thus, soft 
power is a way to entice another into pursuing actions that are beneficial to you instead of using 
force. Joseph Nye, who developed the term in 1990, defines it as “the ability to get what you 
want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” It “arises from the attractiveness of a 
country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”2 Conversely, hard power is forcing another to do 
what you want regardless of his or her attitude towards you. Nye developed the term in 
discussing American policies and global power, particularly surrounding the fall of the Soviet 
																																																								
2 Nye, Jr., Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 
2004. Print. x 
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Union. He claimed that the United States was not just the strongest nation in terms of military 
and economic power, but also soft power.3  
In his 2004 book, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Power, Nye further 
develops the term to combat misinterpretations and ignorance. He writes, “some have trivialized 
[soft power] as merely the influence of Coca-Cola, Hollywood, blue jeans, and money,” while 
some policy makers ignore soft power “and make us all pay the price by squandering it.”4 In 
order to effectively use soft power, nations need to know what it means, how it works, and what 
its limitations are. 
According to Nye there are three primary sources of a country’s soft power: culture, 
political values (i.e. domestic policy), and foreign policy. Culture is defined as “the set of values 
and practices that create meaning for a society.”5 For culture to be an effective source, it should 
be based on universal values, or simply values that others share such as democracy and human 
rights. Culture certainly includes a nation’s popular culture, but it also includes cultural 
exchanges, personal contacts, and commerce.6 Political values and foreign policy go hand-in-
hand because they rely primarily on government decisions. Policies should be genuine, 
responsive to the opinions of others, and based on a broad approach to national interests, 
otherwise policies could undermine a nation’s soft power. As Nye states, “The values a 
government champions in its behavior at home (for example, democracy), in international 
institutions (working with others), and in foreign policy (promoting peace and human rights) 
strongly affect the preferences of others.”7  
																																																								
3 Nye, xi. 
4 Nye, xi. 
5 Nye, 11. 
6 Nye, 13. 
7 Nye, 14. 
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Although soft power is indeed a powerful and useful tool for governments, it does have 
limitations. The most obvious is how difficult it is to measure its effects, a topic addressed in the 
conclusion of this paper. Nye points out that there are conditions in which soft power is useful. 
Soft power is most beneficial when countries are relatively similar, when power is dispersed (as 
it is in democracies), and when it is used to achieve general long-term goals. While some critics 
also say that soft power is too difficult to control because so many private industries and groups 
are involved, Nye sees this as a possible strength and an even bigger reason for governments to 
be involved and reinforce the nation’s soft power. If a country has enough freedom to allow its 
citizens to critique the government, it is seen as more liberal and more attractive to many other 
nations.8 
While Nye was the first to coin the term soft power, the general idea existed long before 
and speaks to sayings like, “You can catch more flies with honey than vinegar.” In 1936 Harold 
Lasswell wrote in Politics: Who Gets What, When, How that “elites” are able to influence 
through several channels, including symbols and practices. Lasswell defines symbols as 
“sanctioned words and gestures” that “elicits blood, work, taxes, applause, from the masses”.9 
These symbols promote the idea of the “common destiny,” or as Nye says, universal values that 
are necessary for an elite’s (or nation’s) agenda to spread. The effective use of symbols enhances 
the elite’s ability to get what it wants without using violence.  
Lasswell also discusses practices, or “procedures [that] comprise all the ways by which 
elites are recruited and trained, all the forms observed in policymaking and administration."10 
Essentially, he is describing how elites, or governments, can alter policy and practices to change 
attitudes and remain in control. This is what Nye calls the attractiveness of a country’s political 																																																								
8 Nye, 16-17. 
9 Laswell, Harold D. Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How. New York: Whittlesey House, 1936. 313. 
10 Lasswell, 360. 
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ideals and policies as mentioned above. When governments can promote universal values and be 
flexible enough to handle popular change, they are seen as more legitimate and appealing. 
Carnes Lord, Professor of Military and Naval Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, 
analyzes one aspect of soft power that governments can overtly control: public diplomacy. He 
defines it using the U.S. Department of State definition: “Public diplomacy refers to government-
sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief 
instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television.”11 
Analyzing the definition’s ambiguity, Lord points out that public diplomacy is most effective 
when it lies between informing and influencing. In discussing American public diplomacy he 
states: 
Public diplomacy is therefore perfectly compatible with a straightforward 
approach to presenting the news that is not very different from what many would 
regard as the model provided by the commercial media. It differs from that model 
by tailoring the information it provides to the needs and concerns of particular 
audiences, and by engaging in proactive and sustained efforts to shape foreign 
perceptions and attitudes in ways supportive of American interests and policy.12 
 
Rather than manipulation, or “spinning” of news stories, public diplomacy is most effective 
when it can convey a government’s point of view on different issues without trying to act as an 
unbiased news source. If independent media outlets are trustworthy enough, people will turn to a 
country’s public diplomacy efforts to figure out what the nation is thinking and why it acted the 
way it did.  
While discussing public diplomacy and its relationship to soft power, Lord also points out 
a few areas of weakness in Nye’s work on the term. One area is the lack of a sufficient 																																																								
11 U.S. Department of State, Dictionary of International Relations Terms. 1987. p. 85. As cited in Lord, 
Carnes. “What ‘Strategic’ Public Diplomacy Is.” Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, 
Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare. Ed. J. Michael Waller. Washington: The Institute of World 
Politics Press, 2008. 43-60. Print.  
12 Lord, 44. 
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explanation for the complex relationship between hard and soft power. Lord discusses how hard 
power may act as an attractive force much like a soft power asset such as culture. Using the 
United States as an example, Lord claims, “Even countries that oppose U.S. policy paradoxically 
derive security, comfort and economic prosperity from the very military capability or presence 
that they so bitterly denounce.” In part because of this, Lord believes the term “influence” is 
more effective than “attraction.”13 This speaks towards the elusive nature of the term “soft 
power” and supports the idea that power is a spectrum more than a strict set of categories.  
Many types of influence or power lie somewhere between “hard” military power and 
“soft” cultural power. Unfortunately, when trying to analyze soft power, a spectrum is much 
more difficult to evaluate than categories.  Nye states that soft power is the ability to get what 
you want without payment, but how do we categorize situations in which countries give 
humanitarian aid in times of crisis or build schools and hospitals? These things certainly cost 
money, but they are not exactly payments or bribes either. What if the military is being used to 
deliver humanitarian aid or spread popular movies and songs to the nations they are deployed to? 
Are these troops considered hard power, soft, or both? 
This ambiguity makes soft power hard to understand and even harder to use effectively. 
As Nye points out, it is often difficult to recognize the effects of soft power on short-term goals. 
Soft power strategies take time to plant, develop, and flourish. Nations can easily showcase hard 
powers with a few missiles and threats, but influencing a country using soft powers such as 
culture, government, or education system is much more challenging. 
 
Dissecting Soft Power 																																																								
13 Lord, Carnes. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, 
Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare. Ed. J. Michael Waller. Washington: The Institute of World 
Politics Press, 2008. 61-73. Print. 65. 
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As defined earlier, Nye’s categories of soft power are culture, political values, and 
foreign policy. While these categories are useful and inclusive, they should be even more 
nuanced to speak to the unique nature of soft power and the wide range of activities it could 
include. Jonathan McClory, author of the Soft Power 30, builds on Nye’s basic outline and the 
IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index to come up with a framework that includes objective and 
subjective data.14 While McClory’s purpose is to rank countries according to their soft power, his 
categories and sub-categories are a great model for analyzing a single country like Russia.  
 Measurable, objective data is split into six sub categories: government, culture, 
engagement, education, enterprise, and digital. Government includes measures of “individual 
freedom, human development, violence in society, and government effectiveness” with the 
purpose of assessing how well the government’s model provides desirable outcomes for its 
citizens.15 The ability of the state to follow through with its policies is particularly important 
because citizens look at other nations’ governments and directly compare them with their own. 
The weaker the government the less legitimacy the country has in the eyes of the world’s 
citizens. Russia’s government, though democratic in name, acts like an authoritarian regime. 
Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization based in the United States, rates 
countries based on civil liberties within the country. For 2015 Russia rated “Not Free” with a 
score of six (out of seven with 1 being the most free and seven being the least) declining from 
five in 2014.16  
Culture is measured by things “like the annual number of visiting international tourists, 
the global success of a country’s music industry, and even a nation’s international sporting 																																																								
14 McClory, Jonathan. The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power. Portland. 19-23. 
15 McClory, 21. 
16 “Freedom in the World: Russia.” Freedom House. 2015. Web. 8 February 2016. 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/russia  
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prowess,” which helps indicate the country’s promotion of universal values.17 In 2013 Russia 
had about 28.4 million foreign visitors, making it the ninth most visited country according to the 
United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).18 Russia gained a lot of press and 
notoriety as the host for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi and is now set to hold the FIFA 
World Cup in 2018. Although both events have been surrounded by controversy over 
infrastructure and bribing, Russia has been able to use these opportunities to attract travellers to 
the country and culture. Perhaps one of the most well known aspects of Russian culture is its 
excellence in performing arts like ballet, composition, and soloists, which has a long history of 
attracting many people to domestic and travelling shows. 
Engagement is the ability of states to interact with the world and includes measurements 
such as “the number of embassies (or high commissions in the case of Commonwealth countries) 
a country has abroad, membership in multilateral organizations, and overseas development 
aid.”19 Russia has made a point to be involved in a number of international organizations and 
partnerships to increase its international clout. Not only does Russia have hundreds of embassies 
and consulates around the world, but it is also an active member of the United Nations, involved 
in a number of UN agencies, as well as a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE), International Labor Organization (ILO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) and many others. Russia also participates in UN peacekeeping and observer missions.20 
																																																								
17 McClory, 21. 
18 United Nations World Tourism Organization. UNWTO Tourism Highlights. 2014. Web. 9 February 
2016. http://www.e-unwto.org/doi/pdf/10.18111/9789284416226  
19 McClory, 21. 
20 “Russia.” Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook. 5 January 2016. Web. 9 February 2016. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html  
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The education sub-category measures the attractiveness of a country’s education system 
through metrics like “the number of international students in a country, the relative quality of its 
universities, and the academic outputs of higher education institutions.”21 Russia has been 
praised for its high level of education, and often ranks on international lists such as the 
Pearson/Economist Intelligence Unit.22 In 2008-2009 Russian universities had over 95,000 
foreign students, with over half of them coming from CIS countries.23 However, one of the 
greatest hindrances to attracting more international students is the Russian university system’s 
incompatibility with the largely accepted Bologna Process, which is an agreement between 
European countries to ensure comparability in education standards.  
Enterprise, though related to the economy “is not a measure of economic power or 
output,” but rather “its competitiveness, capacity for innovation, and ability to foster enterprise 
and commerce.” McClory measures this through measurements of innovation, entrepreneurship, 
and competitiveness.24 Russia has an interesting economic system with a free-reign market in 
some sectors and complete government control in others. The Russians have a particular way of 
doing business, and success depends on foreigners’ abilities to navigate superstition and 
																																																								
21 McClory, 21-22. 
22 Coughlan, Sean. “UK ‘second best education in Europe.’” BBC News. 8 May 2014. Web. 12 April 
2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27314075  
23 “Численность иностранных студентов, обучавшихся в государственных и муниципальных 
высших учебных заведениях российской федерации.” Федеральная служба государственной 
статистики. 2008. Web. 12 April 2016. http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b08_11/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/08-
12.htm  
24 McClory, 22. 
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etiquette.25 However, Bloomberg recently rated the Russian economy 12th for innovation, 
showing some acceptance for new ideas and businesses.26 
The digital sub-category is certainly newer than the other measurements of soft power, 
but it is important especially for its potential reach in countless fields. This sub-category aims to 
“capture the extent to which countries have embraced technology, how well they are connected 
to the digital world, and their use of digital diplomacy through social media platforms.”27 Russia 
is particularly adept at controlling media within its territory and promoting Russian values 
outside it. On November 5, 2015, President Putin reasserted Moscow’s commitment to Russian-
language media abroad “that provides ‘objective and honest’ information on Russia and ‘its 
achievements.’"28 This is most obviously done through Russia Today, or RT, which is the 
Russian Government’s television network and Internet news source that provides news and 
programming from the Russian point of view. It operates in a number of different languages, 
including English, Arabic, and Spanish. Although Putin and the government discuss transparency 
and the need for objective information, they continuously ban different websites and programs. 
One example of this is VKontakte, the Russian equivalent of Facebook that has millions of users. 
The site has faced controversy with the government, displaying Russia’s struggle to control its 
population’s Internet usage and harming their international image on individual freedom.29  																																																								
25 Heinze, Aleksej. “Business Meeting Protocol and Etiquette in Russia.” Passport to Trade. 13 July 
2014. Web. 9 February 2016. http://businessculture.org/blog/2014/07/13/business-meeting-etiquette-in-
russia/  
26 Jamrisko, Michelle and Wei Lu. “These are the World’s Most Innovative Economies.” Bloomberg 
Business. 16 January 2016. Web. 9 February 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-
19/these-are-the-world-s-most-innovative-economies  
27 McClory, 22. 
28 “Putin Pledges Support To Russian-language Media, Universities Abroad.” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty. 5 November 2015. Web. 10 February 2016. http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-putin-support-
russian-language/27347201.html  
29 Balmforth, Tom. “Russia’s Top Social Network Under Fire.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 28 
May 2013. Web. February 10 2016. http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-vkontakte-under-
fire/24999478.html  
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 While Russia can certainly be evaluated using all of these categories, this paper will 
explore Russian soft power through the culture, engagement, and digital categories. Examining 
these three categories gives sufficient evidence for Russia’s use of soft power, but the other 
categories should be addressed in future research. Culture is obviously important to these regions 
to evaluate how much the people identify with the Russian culture and society in comparison to 
the countries that had territorial sovereignty over them. Financial aid, a part of engagement, is 
significant because of the fact that breakaway regions could not operate without Russian 
financial support. In the digital field Russia’s broadcasting abroad is particularly important as a 
source for news and entertainment to people in breakaway regions.  
 While these categories are useful and Nye’s definition has laid a strong foundation of 
understanding, soft power can be viewed through another lens. Nye says that soft power is the 
power of attraction, but he fails to address several important aspects of this tool. Soft power can 
also be used to oppose another country or alliance. While one would want to attract the target 
audience to one’s position, keeping the target from being attracted to someone/thing else can be 
equally important.  
Furthermore, Nye fails to address passive and active soft power. Passive soft power acts 
as a sort of foundation that already exists, and therefore does not require direct action. For 
example, many Ukrainians in eastern Ukraine speak Russian as a result of close ties throughout 
history. Russia does not need to actively teach eastern Ukrainians the Russian language because 
they already know it. On the other hand, only a small minority of Georgians speaks Russian as a 
first language.30 In order to expand Russia’s influence in the country via language, it would need 
to actively engage the Georgian population through practices such as Russian language schools 																																																								
30 “Georgia.” Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook. 5 January 2016. Web. 12 April 2016. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html  
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and exchange programs. Thus, soft power can fall into four different divisions: active and 
convincing, passive and convincing, active and opposing, and passive and opposing. Consider 
Table 1 below.   
Table 1: Soft Power Divisions 
 Convince Oppose 
Active   
Passive   
 
The target and message of soft power is important here, because a single aspect may fall into one 
or multiple divisions. For example, Russian news broadcasts in the Eastern Ukraine aim to 1) 
actively convince the populations that the Russian strategy is better, and 2) actively oppose the 
Ukrainian government’s policies. In the first instance, the target of the broadcast is the 
population in the Eastern Ukraine, and the target in the second instance is the Ukrainian 
government. In these cases the message is the same, but it aims at affecting two different targets.  
 Thinking about soft power in these terms allows us to better understand Russia’s soft 
power strategy as a whole. Identifying different aspects provides us with a clearer picture of 
Russian influence in the breakaway regions and other nations and which dimensions are more 
useful in achieving Russia’s strategic goals.  
 
Organization of Paper 
This paper will analyze two different countries and three breakaway regions: South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk) in Ukraine. The next section, 
Section II, will discuss the history of the breakaway regions and their relationships with their 
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proper countries and Russia. This is critical in understanding why the regions would pursue 
separation and why Russia would help them achieve it. 
Sections III-V will develop a better understanding of the tools Russia uses in 
implementing its soft power and how Ukraine and Georgia are pushing back. The third section 
will discuss how Ukraine and Georgia are competing with Russia through cultural elements like 
music, language, and tourism. The fourth section will explore Russia’s engagement with Eastern 
Ukraine, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia to better understand the amount of support Russia gives 
the regions, and how critical that support is to their survival. The fifth section will investigate the 
digital battles taking place between Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia. Media, especially with the rise 
of the Internet within the past decades, has become increasingly important in influencing people. 
Section VI will draw final conclusions, identifying Russian goals and evaluating the 
effectiveness of Russia’s soft power strategy in frozen conflict regions. Thus, Sections III-VI 
will demonstrate the main argument of this paper that Russian soft power is being used most 
effectively to oppose another nation’s soft power and achieve Russia’s strategic goals in the 
region. 
 
II. History 
The current soft power dynamics in Ukraine, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia can only be 
understood in the proper context. The following section will help put the modern situation into 
perspective. 
 
Ukraine 
Pre-Soviet Union 
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 Ukraine has a long, well-documented history starting around 5000 BCE when humans 
moved into the Dnepr River region and raised crops and livestock. The river was a major trade 
route putting the people, who became known as the Slavs, into contact with people from Central 
Asia, the Middle East, and Scandinavia. A group called the Varangians converged with the Slavs 
and became their leaders, forming a new civilization centered in Kiev called Rus’. This marked 
the start of the Russian civilization. The Mongols conquered the area before the Lithuanian and 
Polish empires split the region in the 14th century and reunified it in the 16th century to protect 
against an independent Moscow. The Poles subjected these people, known as Ruthenians, to 
serfdom and many fled south to the Central Dnepr Basin to a contested region now known as 
Ukraine. They fiercely protected their freedom through a loose militia system and developed into 
a truly independent entity. These warrior-farmers became known as “Cossacks,” and were soon 
powerful enough to raid Constantinople, Poland, and establish an independent country almost as 
large as modern Ukraine. 
 In 1630, the Cossacks turned to Russia for help in keeping the Poles from invading and 
soon became controlled by the Russian tsar. Ukraine remained under Russian control until it was 
split between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the 19th century. During this time Ukrainian 
nationalism was born. During World War I, eastern and western Ukraine fought against each 
other on opposite sides of the conflict. While the Russian Revolution was happening in Russia, 
several independence movements created different Ukrainian states leading to civil war. 
Eventually, eastern Ukraine became the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic within the Soviet 
Union, while western Ukraine was controlled by Poland through the Peace of Riga.31  
 																																																								
31 Wilson, Josh. “Ukraine: Between Russia and Europe.” The School of Russian and Asian Studies. 2 
January 2015. Web. 12 April 2016. http://www.sras.org/ukraine  
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Soviet Union 
 Ukrainians were treated like many of the minorities in the Soviet Union, with shifting 
policies that celebrated their unique culture at times and suppressing it at others. Collectivization 
programs caused a lot of suffering among Ukrainians, and many believe these programs were a 
focused attack that led to the famine in the 1930s known as “Holodomor,” which translates to 
“murder by starvation.” 
 During World War II, Ukraine remained split with the Germans taking control of Poland 
and western Ukraine and the Soviets maintaining the eastern half. The war decimated the region, 
and the Germans destroyed western Ukraine’s strong, vibrant Jewish population.32 Millions were 
evacuated and/or taken to German labor camps during the war, but after the war, deportations 
and purges continued to affect the population.33 Ukrainians largely resented the Soviets, but they 
did industrialize and establish social programs in Ukraine. Under Khrushchev, the friendly 
relationship between the Ukrainian SSR and Russian SFSR was emphasized, leading to the 
transfer of Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. The shift made little 
difference at the time because everything was under Soviet control,34 but as we know today, this 
became a major flashpoint in Ukrainian-Russian relations. Ukraine became independent with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.35 
 
Post-Soviet Union 
																																																								
32 Wilson. 
33 Malynovska, Olena. “Migration and migration policy in Ukraine.” Національний інститут проблем 
міжнародної безпеки України. 14 June 2006. Web. 12 April 2016. 
http://www.niisp.org.ua/defa~177.php  
34 “The Transfer of the Crimea to the Ukraine.” International Committee for Crimea. July 2005. Web. 12 
April 2016. http://www.iccrimea.org/historical/crimeatransfer.html  
35 Wilson. 
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 Ukraine as a democracy was relatively stable following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
but it did experience a large economic slowdown along with rest of the post-Soviet states. 
Political instability returned to Ukraine in 2004 with the Orange Revolution. Following the 
presidential elections that declared the Russian-backed Viktor Yanukovych the winner, 
protestors claimed that there was widespread vote rigging and pushed for new elections. The 
government held a re-vote, and the leader of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko, won 
with 52 percent of the vote. Yushchenko pursued a liberal agenda that moved towards Ukrainian 
integration with the European Union and NATO. Unfortunately, his terms in office left the 
government with large internal divisions along pro-European and pro-Russian lines.  
 Economic issues persisted, especially around what has become known as the “gas wars” 
between Ukraine and Russia over energy prices. The issue was resolved in 2010 when Ukraine 
agreed to extend Russia’s lease on the Sevastopol naval base in exchange for reduced gas prices. 
This agreement was made possible largely by the free and fair election of pro-Russian Viktor 
Yanukovych.36 
 Although he was fairly elected in 2010, Yanukovych’s pro-Russian policy and surprise 
economic deal with Russia over one with Europe led to large protests and movement known now 
as Euromaidan. The protests started peacefully in November 2013, but escalated to violence as 
the Berkut special forces were sent to clear out the protestors under new restrictive anti-protest 
laws. The violence further outraged protestors, leading to stand-offs between police forces and 
citizens. The opposition put forth conditions to be met before it would negotiate with the 
government, including the resignation of the minister of interior and dissolution of the Berkut 
forces. In the long term, protestors wanted Yanukovych to resign, the dissolution of the current 
parliament for new elections, a return to the 2004 Constitution, and the immediate signing of the 																																																								
36 Wilson. 
	 18 
Association Agreement with the EU.37 Protestors organized, built makeshift barricades, and 
established clothing drives and kitchens to sustain the movement. Clashes with police erupted a 
number of times, leaving over 100 people dead and hundreds more wounded.  
 In February 2014, Yanukovych fled Ukraine for Russia and denounced Parliament’s 
decision to remove him as president and set new elections for May 2014. Just after Ukrainian 
parliament disbanded the Berkut forces and new leaders were appointed, pro-Russian gunmen 
seized key buildings in Sevastopol, Crimea, and unidentified men in combat uniforms, who we 
now know were Russian soldiers, appeared in Crimea. On March 1, the Russian Duma approved 
President Putin’s request to use force in Ukraine in order to protect Russian interests. On March 
16, Crimean citizens voted in a referendum to join Russia. The vote passed in a landslide, but 
was denounced by the West as a sham, leading to travel bans and sanctions from the EU and 
United States against Russian and Ukrainian officials involved in the referendum. On March 18, 
Russia absorbed Crimea into the Russian Federation.38 
 In April 2014, pro-Russian protestors began to occupy buildings in Eastern Ukraine, 
escalating as Ukrainian troops were sent to retake control of the region. There were several failed 
attempts to stop the fighting in the region, but the conflict continued to rage on. In May Donetsk 
and Luhansk declared their independence following unrecognized referendums. On May 25 
Ukraine elected Petro Poroshenko president, but voting was not held in much of Eastern Ukraine. 
In July, Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down in rebel-held territory as both sides 
blamed the other for downing the civilian aircraft carrying 298 people. Even after the Russian 
Duma cancelled authorization of use of Russian force in Ukraine, the Ukrainian military 																																																								
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captured and made an exchange of Russian paratroopers. New sanctions continued to be placed 
against Russia for helping to arm the rebels in Eastern Ukraine.39 The conflict finally started to 
deescalate in September and October of 2014 with the first Minsk agreement, but fighting 
continued throughout 2015. In February 2016 a new ceasefire agreement was reached in Minsk, 
but disagreement and conflict persist in the region over implementation. Both the United States 
and EU have extended sanctions against Russia into 2016.40 The current conflict provides the 
context for the use of Russian soft power in Ukraine. Similar situations have occurred in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
 
Abkhazia  
Pre-Soviet Union 
The first mention of the Abkhaz was in the 1st and 2nd century AD. The people spent time 
under Greek, Pontus, Roman, Lazica, Byzantine, and Ottoman rule. During the 11th and 12th 
centuries, the Abkhazian and Georgian kingdoms were united under one ruler before being split 
by the Mongol invasions that left much of Abkhazia relatively untouched. Abkhazia split into 
many small territories until being reunified in 1810 when the Russian Empire annexed the 
region. The Russians put a Christian ruler in place that caused a religious split in the region as 
many Abkhazian Muslims fled to the Ottoman Empire. This resulted in the depopulation of 
Abkhazians and an influx of Russians and Georgians until Abkhazians became the ethnic 
minority in the region.  
During the Russian Revolution Abkhazia split into different factions with some wanting 
to join the new Democratic Republic of Georgia, the nobility supporting the Russian White 																																																								
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Army, and the Abkhazian communists fighting for the Bolsheviks. Eventually in 1918, Abkhazia 
joined the Democratic Republic of Georgia as an autonomous state. 41 
 
Soviet Union 
 In 1921 the Red Army invaded Georgia, established Soviet authority, and made Abkhazia 
a Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), or union republic. It was not until 1931 under Stalin that 
Abkhazia was included in Georgia as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) despite 
protests from Abkhazians. Following this demotion a period of what is historically called 
“Georgianization” began, in which Abkhazian language schools closed, Georgian geographic 
names replaced Abkhazian ones, and history teaching was changed to suggest “that Abkhazians 
were ‘newcomers’ on Georgian land.” Furthermore, Stalin resettled even more Georgians in 
Abkhazia until they numbered roughly 40 percent of the total population in the Abkhazian 
ASSR. Stalin’s policies diminished after his death as Abkhazian schools reopened and the 
Abkhazian language was revived, but the tension did not disappear with Stalin.42 This process of 
“Georgianization” is the main origin of the ethnic hostilities that are the center of the frozen 
conflict today.  
 In the 1980s during perestroika and glasnost, ethnic tensions grew as nationalistic 
movements from both Georgians and Abkhazians increased. Abkhazians were afraid of Georgian 
secession from the Soviet Union and demanded the restoration of their union republic status, 
leading to ethnic violence and rioting in Sukhumi in 1989. Two referendums were held in 1991. 
The first one on March 17 was to renew the Soviet Union, and it passed with 98 percent of the 																																																								
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vote in Abkhazia, but the local Georgians refused to vote in support of the rest of Georgia that 
had done the same. The second referendum for Georgian independence was held on March 31, 
and passed by a significant majority, but this time the Abkhazians boycotted the vote. The 
second referendum was enforced, and Georgia, including Abkhazia, left the Soviet Union.43  
 
Post-1991 
 In effort to keep tensions from escalating, Georgian President Gamsakhurdia tried to 
strike a compromise between Abkhazians (who made up roughly 17 percent of the population) 
and Georgians (who made up about 45 percent) in Abkhazia. Unfortunately, the compromise 
failed to satisfy either party, and the lawmaking body split into pro-Abkhazian and pro-Georgian 
sects. In 1992 Abkhazia pushed for independence from Georgia after a military coup raised fears 
that Abkhazian statehood was in danger. On August 14, 1992, Georgian forces attacked 
Abkhazia and fighting continued until September 30, 1993. The Sochi Agreement was signed at 
the end of July 1993, but the ceasefire was broken on September 16, 1993 by pro-Abkhaz forces. 
With simultaneous fighting in Mingrelia, Georgian forces were trapped in the middle and 
defeated. Fighting ceased everywhere, except the Kodori Valley, which was settled after another 
ceasefire was agreed up on May 14, 1994. Russia’s role in this conflict was inconsistent due to 
the conflicting views of different politicians and the military, and both Georgians and 
Abkhazians received aide form Russia at some point in the conflict.44  
Human rights abuses occurred on both sides of the conflict. The Human Rights Watch 
report in 1995 stated the following:  
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The combination of indiscriminate attacks and targeted terrorizing of the civilian 
population was a feature of both sides' deliberate efforts to force the population of the 
other party's ethnic group out of areas of strategic importance. The practice was adopted 
first by the Georgian side, in the second half of 1992, and later, more effectively, by the 
Abkhaz side. The parties terrorized and forced the enemy ethnic population to flee, or 
took members of the enemy population hostage for leverage in later bargaining over 
population swaps. The Abkhaz conflict stands out in that in some cases entire villages 
were held hostage on the basis of the ethnicity of their population. Once Abkhaz forces 
had gained control of Abkhazia and the fighting died down, they prevented the free return 
to Abkhazia of displaced persons, who are overwhelmingly Georgian. 45 
 
After the conflict, political differences remained and hindered the repatriation of about 200,000 
displaced persons. 
 The 2008 War between Russia and Georgia began over hostilities between South 
Ossetians and Georgians, but the hostilities extended into other regions of Georgia, including 
Abkhazia. Until 2008 Abkhazia had control of all its territory except the Kodori Valley. As 
Russian troops moved to take control of South Ossetia, Abkhazian and Russian forces retook 
control of the area. 46  A ceasefire was agreed upon, but Abkhazia remains a disputed territory in 
eyes of Georgians and much of the international community.  
 
South Ossetia  
Pre-Soviet Union 
In the 13th century, the people now known as Ossetians moved into the region of South 
Ossetia. The people, called Alans, were fleeing the Mongol invasion of Alania, a Chrisitan 
kingdom in the North Caucasus, when they settled across the Caucasus Mountains in modern-
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day South Ossetia. After the Mongols, power was fragmented until the Russian Empire extended 
into North Ossetia before taking over South Ossetia and Georgia in 1801.47  
 Georgia, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia, separated from the Russian Empire 
during the Russian Revolution. Ethnic tensions deteriorated relations between Georgians and 
Ossetians. The Menshevik-dominated Georgian government accused the Ossetians of working 
with the Bolsheviks, whose slogan ‘land to the peasants’ inspired armed soldiers from Ossetia 
and Georgia to return home and demand land from Georgian landowners. As the government in 
Tiflis (Tbilisi) tried to disarm these soldiers, tensions escalated and the Ossetians rebelled in 
February 1918. This rebellion was one of numerous peasant rebellions, but at this point it was a 
social conflict over land distribution, not an ethnic one. It was not until the Ossetian National 
Council, which was the main body for Ossetian political demands, elected a Bolshevik 
dominated Council in December of 1918 that the creation of South Ossetian independent 
political unit was demanded and the group refused to participate in the Georgian government.48 
 The situation escalated as the Council began to construct a road across the Roki Pass to 
North Ossetia, and the Georgian government sent troops to disband the Council for new elections 
in 1919. On May 7, 1920, Georgia and Russia signed a peace treaty that recognized Georgian 
independence, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Russia was preoccupied with 
developments in the Russian Civil War.49 The Ossetians then launched another rebellion with 
demands for the establishment of Soviet authority in South Ossetia despite the treaty. As the 
Georgians tried to reestablish control they began to see the Ossetians as traitors and the mission 
became a punitive expedition in which forty villages were burned, 5,000 to 20,000 people died, 																																																								
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and about 35,000 refugees fled to North Ossetia.50 The class struggle between peasants and 
landowners fell along ethnic lines, which allowed the conflict to develop into a distinctly ethnic 
struggle. This is the real start to the conflict between Georgians and Ossetians that persists today. 
  
Soviet Union 
 When the Red Army established Soviet authority in 1921, South Ossetia presented a 
particular dilemma to the Bolsheviks; they could either grant South Ossetia autonomy as a 
reward for their support of the Bolsheviks, or they could keep South Ossetia under the authority 
of Georgia.51 In the end, South Ossetia was given an autonomous status within Georgia as the 
South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast on April 20, 1922.52 This was the first time that South 
Ossetians had any official political entity. Georgia became the Georgian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (a union republic) in 1936 under the USSR Constitution that included the Abkhazian 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Adjar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the 
South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast.53 For the majority of the Soviet period that followed, South 
Ossetians and Georgians lived in peace and intermarried.  
 The Soviet Union had a four-tier ethno-federal hierarchy with the greatest political 
autonomy in the union republics and progressively less in the autonomous republics, oblasts, and 
okrugs. Minorities in the USSR were governed by a dual policy of maintaining and strengthening 
ethnic institutions while also promoting the use of the Russian language. By enacting this sort of 
policy, Russian became essential to Soviet society and led to greater ethnic assimilation of non-
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Russians, especially in the less autonomous republics and oblasts.54 In South Ossetia, Ossetian 
was only taught at the elementary level, while Georgian was the primary language.55 There was a 
backlash against the Soviet policies as perestroika began under Gorbachev, because non-
Russians began to see the policies as destroying their group’s culture and language. The ethnic 
institutions put in place as part of the dual policy towards minorities offered the platforms 
necessary for the eventual breakup of the USSR.  
 As of 1989, when the last official census in South Ossetia was conducted, about 66.2 
percent of the population identified as Ossetian and 29 percent as Georgian (additional minorities 
included Russian at 2.2 percent, Armenian at 1 percent, and Jewish at 0.4 percent).56 Due to 
rising nationalism in South Ossetia via the popular movement Adamon Nikhas (Voice of the 
People), the South Ossetian regional council asked the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR to 
be upgraded from an autonomous oblast to an autonomous republic on November 10, 1989. 
Georgians were generally outraged by the demands, seeing them as illegitimate and a threat to 
their territorial integrity. The application was rejected on November 16. Georgians planned a 
march on Tskhinvali, the motives of which are disputed, that led to violence on November 23. 
Between 12,000 and 15,000 Georgians were met by Ossetians, militia, and soldiers from the 
Soviet Army to prevent the group from entering the city. In the following days retaliatory 
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violence continued leaving six dead, twenty-seven with gunshot wounds, and another 140 
hospitalized [Human Rights Watch (referred to hereafter as HRW) 1992, 6-7].57 
The violence subsided, but South Ossetians continued their demands for greater 
autonomy, and the Georgian government prepared for elections that excluded Adamon Nikhas. 
On September 20, 1990, South Ossetia declared sovereignty as a democratic republic within the 
USSR, boycotting Georgian elections.58 In response, the Georgian government abolished the 
Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia on December 11, 1990, declaring the Soviet Republic of 
South Ossetia as illegal.59 
On December 12, 1990, Georgia declared a state of emergency and dispatched interior 
forces to Tskhinvali. The South Ossetians saw this as an occupation, and urban warfare and 
retaliatory ethnic attacks continued in the following weeks with Russia giving sporadic support 
to the South Ossetians. The flow of refugees became intense as Georgians fled Tskhinvali to 
escape ethnic violence and as Ossetians in other parts of Georgia were attacked. Informal 
negotiations led to the withdrawal of Georgian forces on January 26, 1991, but violence 
continued, worsening throughout 1991. Subsequent talks failed for a number of reasons, but one 
is that the nationalist focused Georgian President Gamskhurdia used the conflict to boost his 
appeal, keeping a multi-national commission, the Joint Control Commission (JCC), from 
resolving the violence.60 
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Post-1991 
 The Soviet Union announced its dissolution on December 26, 1991, but Georgia had 
declared its independence via referendum on April 9, 1991. Additionally, the Georgian 
constitution declared that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia were included in the sovereign 
territory of the country.61 South Ossetians held a referendum for independence from Georgia on 
January 19, 1992 in which the majority favored independence from Georgia and unification with 
Russia. Georgia rejected this resolution as a clear infringement of its territorial integrity.62 
Violence continued until the Russian-brokered Sochi Treaty called for the withdrawal of military 
forces and established the Joint Control Commission of mixed forces to ensure the provisions of 
the agreement were met.63 The war left the region devastated; about 1,000 people died, 100 went 
missing, approximately 100,000 Ossetians fled Georgia and South Ossetia, and 23,000 
Georgians fled the region.64  
 There was relative peace between South Ossetia and Georgia until President Saakashvili 
came to power following the Rose Revolution. One of his top priorities was the reintegration of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia through economic and cultural programs “including an Ossetian-
language television station, pensions, free fertilizer, and humanitarian aid” as well as the closure 
of the wholesale market with smuggled goods from Russia. Smuggling of goods was a major 
source of income in South Ossetia at the time. Tensions increased due to roadblocks that 
restricted traffic for the anti-smuggling campaign, but never reached warfare despite exchanges 
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of fire and dozens of casualties (HRW 2009, 18).65 Tbilisi and Tskhinvali disagreed on the 
format of the JCC and Russia’s role, which also strained Russian-Georgian relations, completely 
severing them in September 2006, which led to the expulsion of more than 2,300 Georgians from 
Russia.66 
 Tensions continued to escalate despite renewed communication between the two 
countries by April 2008. Russia became more involved with the breakaway administrations and 
Georgia blocked negotiations over Russia’s admission into the World Trade Organization in 
response. Each side conducted military exercises and violent skirmishes between South Ossetia 
and Georgia became more frequent. On August 1, 2008 several Georgian police officers were 
injured in a bomb attack in South Ossetia, and six South Ossetian police officers were shot in 
retaliation. Violence continued, and on August 7 Georgian forces began shelling Tskhinvali. 
Georgia claims they were responding to South Ossetian attacks and the imminent threat by 
Russian forces moving south through the Roki tunnel, while Russia claims that Georgia was the 
aggressor and it simply responded on South Ossetia’s behalf.67 It is unclear what the intentions of 
both forces were, but the war had begun when Georgian forces attacked Tskhinvali on August 7.  
 Around 10,000 Russian troops moved into the area forcing Georgian forces to withdraw 
from Tskhinvali to Gori city. On August 12, Russian forces pursued, and by August 15, they 
advanced past Gori city to within 45 kilometers of Tbilisi. The short war officially ended on 
August 16 with a ceasefire agreement calling for the withdrawal of forces to their pre-August 6 
positions with Russian peacekeeping forces as security until international monitors could be put 
in place. Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on August 28, 																																																								
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2008, and kept 7,600 troops in the two regions. 68 
 Human Rights Watch investigated humanitarian law violations during the conflict and 
found that all sides, Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia, disregarded international law by 
conducting indiscriminate attacks.69 About 192,000 people were displaced by the conflict with 
127,000 in Georgia, 30,000 in South Ossetia, and 35,000 in North Ossetia in the Russian 
Federation (Amnesty International 2008, 48).70 Many were able to return to their homes, but a 
significant number (about 30,000 Georgians and 4,000 South Ossetians) remained displaced a 
year later.71 
These conflicts demonstrate Russia's effective use of hard power, but Russia uses soft 
power in its foreign policy. Soft power allows Russia to further influence Georgia and the 
Ukraine. One of the most important components of soft power is cultural influence in areas such 
as music, language, and tourism.  
 
III. Culture  
Both Ukraine and Georgia share a number of cultural ties with Russia due to their 
inclusion in the USSR and long history as neighbors. Ukraine has a historically closer position to 
the Russian culture, but its strong independence movements have largely soured official relations 
between their governments. The cultural stage has turned into a competition of national pride, 
often dividing the Ukrainians and Russians. However, Eastern Ukraine has a number of 
characteristics that draw its citizens to Russia, including language. On the other hand, Georgia is 
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ethnically and culturally different from Russia, but this fact does not stop the two from 
competing in cultural dimensions. 
 
Music and the Arts 
Ukraine 
 While Russia and Ukraine are facing off militarily in Eastern Ukraine, the two countries 
are also going head to head in the musical realm. This is one example of how each country’s soft 
power is being used to actively oppose the other. The Eurovision Song Contest is a popular TV 
song contest organized by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) in which each participating 
country enters an original song to be performed and voted on during a live television broadcast. 
It’s estimated that over 200 million people watch the event worldwide.72 The notoriety of 
Eurovision makes it the perfect stage for a country to spread its political agenda, however, the 
contest rules state that “No lyrics, speeches, gestures of a political or similar nature shall be 
permitted during the Eurovision Song Contest.”73  
Although the rules are explicit, the contest remains a cultural and political battleground. 
In the May 2014 contest hosted by Denmark in Copenhagen, both Ukraine and Russia were 
finalists. Russia entered a song, “Shine” by The Tolmachevy Sisters, which received some 
criticism for its lyrics, “Living on the edge / closer to the crime / cross the line a step at a time.” 
Seemingly foreshadowing Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the song received some boos from the 
audience. When Ukraine’s contestant, Mariya Yaremchuck, performed her song “Tick-Tock,” 
she was heckled by a small group of Russian supporters in the crowd. Perhaps unknown to those 																																																								
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audience members, Yaremchuck is a supporter of the Party of Regions, the Ukrainian party of 
former President Yanukovych. While discussing the situation in Ukraine she said, “Everyone in 
Ukraine was shocked. It really affects me because I will try my best to prove that Ukrainians are 
a strong nation and conflicts end, but music lives. I hope Ukraine will start a new life and a new 
page.” 74 Neither Ukraine nor Russia won the 2014 Eurovision contest, but it is clear that the two 
nations were competing for more than music bragging rights; they were competing to change the 
international narrative of the Ukraine Crisis. 
The latest Eurovision competition has once again sparked a controversy between Ukraine 
and Russia. With a record number of voters in the national selection, Ukraine’s 2016 entry by 
Jamala entitled “1944” harkens back to the deportation of Crimean Tatars by Joseph Stalin. 
Jamala, who is part Tatar and Armenian, said she was inspired by her grandmother’s account of 
the purges.75 Some Russian politicians are speaking out against the song, calling it “politicized.” 
One representative, first deputy chairman of the Duma Committee on Information Policy Vadim 
Dengin, said “A strange choice. I'm sure it is there to once again humiliate Russia,” and even 
went on to say that “the majority of Ukrainian citizens do not receive enough ‘salary or pension’ 
and so cannot ‘afford to watch’ and ‘do not care’ about the Eurovision Song Contest.”76 This is a 
clear attack against the Ukrainian government’s seeming inability to pay the citizens in the 
breakaway regions their pensions and other benefits.  
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While Russian politicians took aim at the song, Ukrainian lawmakers and celebrities 
hailed the performance for its originality, emotion, and ability to win the 2016 contest. Ruslana, 
the 2004 Eurovision winner from Ukraine, when speaking about Jamala and “1944” said, “This 
is absolute originality, this is the suffering Ukraine that we are now.” Mustafa Dzhemilev, a 
Ukrainian lawmaker and a prominent Crimea Tatar leader, praised the song for bringing the issue 
to higher level. He said that after Eurovision “the whole world will know about ‘1944.’”77 It 
seems that the Eurovision stage will once again be a sort of battleground for Ukraine and Russia 
to fight for international and national support using soft power tools.  
Eurovision is not the only place where music, politics, and war have collided. Several 
Russian celebrities have chosen sides in the ongoing conflict. Musicians that have publicly 
supported Ukraine have been essentially blacklisted from performing in Russia to avoid dissent 
within in the country. Andrei Makarevich, Diana Abenina, and Noize MC have been called 
“traitors” and “friends of the junta,” which is what the Russian government calls the pro-Western 
Ukrainian government. Meanwhile, stars like Valeriya have come out in support of Russia’s 
moves in Ukraine, saying that “Crimea is Russian territory, it always has been.” Other artists 
have even travelled to Eastern Ukraine and mingled with the rebels on and off stage. In 2014, 
actor Mikhail Porechenkov fired a machine gun in the area around the Donetsk airport under 
rebel control. Singer Iosif Kobzon visited the Donetsk Opera House with the Russian interior 
ministry choir and invited a rebel leader on stage to sing a duet with him.78 Russia and Ukraine 
have been going head to head in the music industry since Crimea was annexed and violence 
began in 2014. In 2016, there are no signs of this stopping.  																																																								
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Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
Unlike Ukraine and Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia do not have professional music 
industries. Most of the popular music comes from Russia, because both regions are heavily 
influenced by Russian media and broadcasting, which will be discussed further in the digital 
category. Georgia has minimal influence within the regions, but, like Ukraine, they did face off   
with Russia at the Eurovision Song Contest. In 2009, Georgia submitted the song “We Don’t 
Wanna Put In” by Stephane and 3G. The controversial lyrics, “We don't wanna put in / The 
negative mood / It's killing the groove,” were widely interpreted as mocking Putin, who was 
prime minister at the time. Stephane and 3G did not deny that it was “a protest against Russian 
policies,” saying that “In any democratic country it would be taken as a harmless joke.” 
Although EBU gave Georgia the option of changing the lyrics or choosing a different song,’ 84.9 
percent of Georgians were opposed, according to the Georgian TV channel ‘Rustavi 2.’ Georgia 
withdrew their entry voicing suspicions that the EBU decided to ask Georgia to revise the song 
due to pressure from Russia, which hosted the 2009 contest. While Russia opposes Georgia in 
the Eurovision contest, its music has infiltrated the airwaves in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
drawing listeners to the latest Russian pop music. 
 
Language 
 Language is a complex and important topic in many regions due to its dynamic and 
amorphous nature.  In post-Soviet states, language and language policy is either heavily 
influenced by or created in opposition to Russia. Because the official language of the USSR was 
Russian, most states have populations that understand or use Russian regularly. This fact makes 
	 34 
language a great soft power tool, but also one that Russia has not had to directly control in many 
cases. Instead of actively insisting that regions use Russian as their official language, the 
breakaway regions have elected to do so willingly. After all, it was only 25 years ago that 
Ukraine and Georgia became independent from the USSR.  
 
Ukraine 
 Today language in Ukraine is a contentious issue, splitting the country almost perfectly in 
half into Ukrainian-speaking Western Ukraine and Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine. According 
to the 2001 all-Ukrainian census, 67.5 percent of the population speaks Ukrainian and 29.6 
percent speaks Russian. Eighty five point two percent of Ukrainians speak Ukrainian while 14.8 
percent speak Russian. Of the Russian population, 95.9 percent speak Russian and 3.9 speak 
Ukrainian. It is not surprising that the mother tongue of each matched their nationality. What is 
more surprising is that the ethnic Georgians living in Ukraine speak Russian more than 
Georgian; 54.4 percent to 36.7 percent respectively.79  
 In the now breakaway regions of Luhansk and Donetsk Russian speakers make up 68.8 
percent and 74.9 percent of the population respectively. Furthermore of the ethnic Ukrainians in 
Luhansk about half speak Russian, while almost 60 percent speak Russian in Donetsk.80 The data 
for all of the language percentages are outdated due to the lack of a complete Ukrainian census 
since 2001, but they are indicative of the overall trend of languages spoken in Ukraine. It is 
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unsurprising that the country is divided geographically, linguistically, and even culturally 
through the middle. This division makes Eastern Ukraine an easier target for the influence of 
Russian soft power. However, as Asya Pereltsvaig points out, it is important to remember that 
while Ukrainian and Russian are different languages, their similarity in structure, sound, and 
vocabulary make mutual comprehension relatively easy.81  
 Language has developed into a flashpoint in the Ukrainian conflict over the course of the 
conflict “and as a direct result of it.” In April 2015 Pereltsvaig concluded from surveys 
conducted by Kiev International Institute of Sociology that: 
The more Russia intervenes in Eastern Ukraine, the more Ukrainians are pushed away 
from Russia: they do not want Russia to interfere in their country’s internal affairs, nor to 
see Ukraine with closer political and economic ties to Russia, and their attitudes towards 
Russians and the Russian language are worsening. Regional divisions—and the west-east 
continuum of identities, linguistic preferences, and political attitudes—persist, but even 
in the most Russian-oriented Donbass area, pro-Russian attitudes are not very strong and 
are apparently weakening.82 
 
Although Pereltsvaig concludes, perhaps a little optimistically, that the pro-Russian attitudes in 
Eastern Ukraine are “not very strong and apparently weakening,” language certainly remains a 
highly emotionally charged topic that requires clear legislation to unite the differing regions.  
Early on in the conflict, following Euromaidan and the removal of former Ukrainian 
President Yanukovych, the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill abolishing a law allowing the 
country’s regions to make Russian a second official language. The bill was largely condemned 
by the international community and Russia, and remains unsigned but also un-vetoed by the 
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current Ukrainian President, Poroshenko.83 It is unlikely that the president would move to enact 
the law because it would only incite further violence and separatist sentiments, but the fact that it 
remains a possibility shows just how important language is in Ukraine. 
In this case, language is a passive force, acting as a foundation for other forms of Russian 
soft power. In Eastern Ukraine, the message that all Russian speakers are part of a larger russkii 
mir or “Russian world” resonates far better than it would in regions where Russian is actively 
taught but not natively spoken. Russia is able to invoke pride through language without spending 
time and money on crossing a language barrier. 
 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
 Unlike Ukraine, language usage is not as controversial in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
These regions have predominantly non-Russian populations, so, although Russian is an official 
language in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the population typically uses their respective 
national languages. In Abkhazia, the official language is Abkhaz with Russian used as the 
“means of inter-ethnic communication.” The de facto government also recognizes that Armenian 
and Georgian are common languages, but no statistics are provided for the actual breakdown of 
the languages used by the population. If it can be assumed that language usage is based on a 
person’s nationality, then roughly half the population speak Abkhaz, a fifth speak Georgian, 
another fifth Armenian, and a tenth Russian. The Abkhazian Ministry of Foreign Affairs lists 
nine language options for its website including: Abkhaz, Russian, English, Turkish, German, 
Italian, Arabic, Spanish, and French.84 Given the large number of Georgians and Armenians, it is 																																																								
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surprising that the government does not provide a translation of the website for these groups. 
Either this is a political statement by the government, or it is assumed that those populations can 
also speak one of the nine languages listed.   
 In South Ossetia, Ossetian and Russian are the official government languages while the 
Georgian language is recognized as official only in areas densely populated by ethnic Georgians. 
As of 2014, the population of South Ossetia was about 89 percent Ossetian and about 9 percent 
Georgian while the remaining 1-2 percent of the population was Russian or other.85  
 
Tourism 
Ukraine 
In 2014, about 42,000 Ukrainians entered Russia specifically on tourist visas. Russians 
report that about 9.8 million Ukrainians entered the country, but this includes tourists and all 
other entries, including refugees. Data for the first 9 months of 2015 showed that roughly 27,000 
tourists entered Russia from Ukraine while total entry was around 7.8 million people.86 Since the 
beginning of the Ukraine Crisis, tourism to Ukraine declined, up to 18 percent according to one 
report. There is anecdotal research that suggests that many Russians want to travel within Russia 
due to international sanctions.87 A big hit to tourism and other travel between the countries 
occurred when the Russian and Ukrainian governments banned direct flights between the nations 
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in October 2015. According to the Russian Transport Minister, roughly $110 million could be 
lost each year in both Russia and Ukraine. Instead, would be air travelers need to take indirect 
flights or the much longer train trips.88 
In the months just before the Russian annexation of Crimea and crisis in Eastern Ukraine, 
a website for “adventure seekers who dream about reviving the USSR” can go and learn tactics 
for getting into Ukraine and, as one Russian said, “helping brotherly people defend their rights.” 
The Daily Beast, a news agency based in New York, has called this “insurrectional tourism” 
supported by the Russian government to obscure the origins of the men fighting in Eastern 
Ukraine.89  
The change in the Crimean administration is the largest difference in tourism for Ukraine 
and Russia. Instead of being considered a part of Ukraine, the annexed region is now counted as 
a part of Russia. Before its annexation, about 80 percent of tourists were from Ukraine, while 
roughly 20 percent were from Russia. This has shifted completely to be almost entirely Russian 
tourists, mostly due to the Russian government’s advertising campaign to get more tourists to 
Crimea.90  
 
Abkhazia 
Abkhazians frequently visited Russia in 2014 with a total of 362,811 entries, but it is 
unclear what their purpose of entry was. The number of entries is significantly larger than the 
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current population of Abkhazia suggesting that single travellers crossed the border multiple 
times. There is no data or explanation for the number from the Russian government, but given 
the strong economic relationship between Russia and Abkhazia, it can be assumed that many 
entries were related to jobs in Russia and not as much for tourism.   
Although it is unclear how many Abkhazians visit Russia as tourists, for Abkhazia, 
tourism is a major part of the economy that has suffered since the conflict in the early 1990s. In 
2014, the Abkhazian Tourism Minister Tengiz Lakerbai stated, “The war91 did us tremendous 
harm. In fact all the resorts were plundered. Now we use only 30 percent of what we had before 
the war.”92 Pre-conflict statistics on tourism are largely unreliable, fluctuating between 200,000 
to 2 million. According to one report, tourist arrivals in Abkhazia peaked at two million annually 
in the 1980s93, while another said about 202,000 tourists visited Abkhazia annually before the 
conflict in the 1990s. In 2003 the former Abkhazian Tourism Minister, Astamur Adleiba, 
claimed that tourism had reached pre-conflict levels; however, the Georgian government doubted 
the accuracy of the claim. 94   
 In 2009 Abkhazian officials reported that tourist entries reached one million, but this 
number can be deceiving because many tourists are “day-trippers.” These tourists cross into 
Abkhazia for the day and visit a few major sites before heading back to Russia the same day.95  
In 2014, the Abkhazian Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed that there were 3.5 million visitors 
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in the previous tourist season.96 Both groups have an incentive to hedge the numbers in opposite 
directions to promote their view of Abkhazia’s tourist industry. The Georgian government 
released information where the numbers were lower, almost certainly in an effort to prove that 
Abkhazia’s economy is not as well off as it was when the region was a part of Georgia. 
Meanwhile, Abkhazia continues to report significantly higher numbers in order for the tourism 
industry to seem more stable.  
Russians are attracted to the region because there is no visa requirement and the costs of 
visiting are extremely cheap in comparison to other destinations like Turkey.97 While Abkhazia 
certainly has a lot to offer tourists on a budget, there are some Abkhazians who have shown 
annoyance with the Russians that visit the country’s beaches and towns. In August 2014 the City 
Council in Sukhumi banned walking in swimwear outside of beach areas, calling on Russian 
tourists to cover themselves in public. Abkhazia is a conservative area like much of the Caucasus 
region, so speedo- and bikini-wearing Russians are viewed as vulgar and inappropriate to 
Abkhazians. The ban is seen as a bold move considering the large number of Russian tourists 
that Abkhazia depends on to keep its economy afloat.98 
 The tourism industry may also feel a little bit of strain from competition with the Russian 
city of Sochi and recently annexed Crimean Peninsula.99 In 2008, Abkhazia expected “massive 
economic development over the next few years” as a result of being recognized by Russia as an 
independent state, but there has not been much evidence of major growth in the region. There 																																																								
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was a lot of hope that the 2014 Winter Olympics would bring Abkhazians a lot of jobs just across 
the border.100 Unfortunately, a lot of those hopes were not realized due to politics, security, and 
corruption. In the political realm, the Georgian government actively cooperated with Russia on 
the Games by offering to provide security101, undercutting the importance of Abkhazian 
collaboration. The Abkhazian airport and tourist sites were not used for the Games, despite their 
close proximity to Sochi, because security on the Abkhaz-Russian border was substantially 
tightened. Russia needed to ensure that there was no chance of terrorist groups using Abkhazia as 
a way to entire Russia and attack Sochi, which limited Abkhazians mobility across the border. 
Furthermore, corruption within Russia meant that other companies were favored as suppliers 
over their Abkhazian counterparts. Despite these negative aspects, Abkhazians did not feel 
negatively about Russia because the Games also helped bring attention to the region and 
increased the security in Abkhazia as a whole. 102 
 While tourism is the largest part of the Abkhazian economy that is not directly funded by 
the Russian government, it is supported almost entirely by Russian private citizens. Despite 
cultural differences and disappointing returns on their Olympic hopes, Abkhazia’s dependence 
and opinion on its northern neighbor is not likely to change.  
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South Ossetia 
 Unlike Abkhazia and Ukraine, South Ossetia does not offer much in terms of tourist sites 
or amenities. Like Abkhazia, there is no visa requirement to travel between South Ossetia and 
Russia. However, travel entries between Russia and South Ossetia is completely one-sided with 
117, 283 entries into Russia from South Ossetia in 2014.103 Again the number of entries is much 
larger than the population of South Ossetia, meaning that travellers are crossing the border 
multiple times. This suggests that crossings are more regular and are probably more for 
conducting business than cultural exchanges and tourism. There is no data on the number of 
Russian tourists or visitors entering South Ossetia. Therefore, the effects of tourism in the region 
are negligible, and likely have no bearing on relations or the population’s attitude towards 
Russia. 
 
IV. Engagement 
Russian engagement in the breakaway regions is extensive and includes everything from 
monetary and humanitarian aid to the opening of embassies and issuing of Russian passports. As 
Russia used its hard power in supplying weapons and soldiers to the Eastern Ukrainian 
separatists, it also opened the door for Russian soft power to be exercised in the region. The 
fighting in Donbass provided the perfect opportunity for Russia to save the day with 
humanitarian aid to the people. Russia set itself up to be the hero nation that the Eastern 
Ukrainians could turn to when their own government could do nothing to help them. Meanwhile, 
with most of the world focused on the conflict in Ukraine, Russia quietly signed agreements with 
the breakaway regions in Georgia. Strengthening these partnerships has been criticized as the 
effective annexation of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 																																																								
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Ukraine 
 The largest amount of support that Russia provides to the breakaway region in Eastern 
Ukraine is humanitarian aid in the form of food, supplies, and refugee shelters. Following the 
annexation of Crimea and Euromaidan protests, the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) declared 
its independence from Ukraine on April 7, 2014.104 The Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) 
declared independence shortly after the DPR but quickly agreed to merge in a confederation 
called Novorossiya. Only South Ossetia has recognized the independence of the region, doing so 
on June 27, 2014.105 Nearly two years later, Russia has still not recognized the region’s 
independence. This is most likely due to the constantly changing frontline of the war and 
unstable ceasefire, but refraining from recognizing these regions as independent serves another 
purpose; it keeps the conflict from being settled politically. Russia publicly maintains its support 
of Eastern Ukraine under the banner of protecting all Russians regardless of their citizenship to 
keep up popular opinion in the region, while simultaneously refusing to recognize their 
independence. Thus, Russia does not need to recognize the DPR because it can win the hearts 
and minds of the people in the Donbass region by supplying humanitarian aid to the war stricken 
area.  
The Donbass region as a whole has received thousands of tons of humanitarian aid from 
Russia. In October 2015 Russia sent a 100-truck convoy with more than 1,000 tons of food and 
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other items, delivering more than 50,000 tons of aid in one year.106 The aid flow has not slowed 
down since. The 49th envoy of 101 Russian trucks was sent in February 2016, but Ukrainian 
border guards raised concerns about the contents, claiming the canned food was expired.107  
The Russian Emergency Affairs Minister Vladimir Stepanov, while discussing the aide 
envoy, stated that Russian hospitals would also care for another 20 children injured in the combat 
zone.108 In June 2014 over 6,300 Ukrainians have sought treatment from Russian doctors in the 
227 Ukrainian refugee camps that were set up in Russian regions.109 As of August 2015, about 
21,000 refugees live in 369 temporary camps. The Russian government eased the migration rules 
for Ukrainians seeking safety from the violence in the Donbass region, allowing entry with 
internal passports.110  
In December 2015, the head of the Mercator Group, a Moscow-based think tank, said that 
while Russia could use the workers, the government was not prepared for the large influx of 
Ukrainians. Another report says that many skilled workers from Ukraine have had a hard time 
finding legal work for which they are qualified. For the refugees the bureaucratic headache has 
led many to experience long waits for permits, to have bribes demanded from them, or even to 
ignore the need for proper documentation altogether. Russia has made exceptions for Ukrainians 
who have fled from the war in Donbass, but other Ukrainians who have fled for political reasons 																																																								
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have had to renew all their documents or be deported. While some Ukrainians are adamant that 
they are not going back to Ukraine, these issues and the Minsk peace talks have led to fears that 
there will be a mass reverse exodus and Russia will lose a vital opportunity to hold onto these 
well-educated people.111  
In February 2016, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development supported an initiative 
from the State Duma to increase the population beyond the Ural Mountains by creating some 
50,000 jobs that could be taken by Ukrainians. The program has received some criticism from 
the Federal Migration Service that has said that a specific program is unnecessary.112  Whether 
successful or not, campaigns such as this are proof that Russian politicians are aware that 
Ukrainians could be a valuable resource to Russia as human capital as well as the spread of pro-
Russian sentiment. 
Although Russia only publicly supports the Peoples Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk 
through humanitarian aide, it has also provided the funds to pay the salaries of government 
workers in Eastern Ukraine. Until June and part of July 2014, the Ukrainian government in Kiev 
paid the salaries of public servants in euros or hryvnia. Through the fall and winter of 2014-2015 
these workers received little to no salary because the region was under rebel control. From April 
2015 onward, these salaries have been drastically reduced and paid in Russian rubles. The drastic 
rise in food prices to sync with the Russian economy has hurt those in Eastern Ukraine. The 
people are mostly relying on double pensions, receiving money from both Russia (via the new 
republics) and Ukraine. Receiving the double pension requires a great deal of work and includes 
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crossing the frontlines of the conflict. Ukrainian politicians are aware that people are receiving 
double pensions, but they have decided to not take direct action against the practice, as it is not in 
Ukraine’s best interest to “punish its citizens in occupied territories.” But while pensions are 
being handed out, social benefits require citizens to have residency in the area controlled by 
Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian Ministry for Social Affairs in Kiev, payments for social 
benefits in Donetsk and Luhansk have fallen by about 70 percent, but risen about the same 
number in other regions. This suggests that the people are still managing to get social benefits by 
registering as refugees while continuing to live in Donetsk in Luhansk.113  Neither system alone 
is enough for the people living in the regions to survive, but by exploiting the unofficial nature of 
the programs, most are able to barely maintain their families. 
 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
Following the conflicts in the early 1990s and again in the 2000s, Russia issued nearly all 
South Ossetians and Abkhazians Russian passports. The laws on citizenship in both Russia and 
Georgia identify the main documentation of national citizenship as the passport. Possession of a 
passport from either is essentially proof of citizenship. For Russia, the process of obtaining a 
Russian passport as a resident in a former Soviet state that had not become a citizen of the new 
state was simplified in 2002. The process was further simplified for Abkhazians and South 
Ossetians who did not even need to leave their homes to obtain Russian citizenship; their 
documents were simply sent to the closest Russian city to be verified. Nearly 90 percent of the 
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less than 100,000 South Ossetians,114 and by June of 2002, an estimated seventy percent of the 
people in Abkhazia held Russian citizenship through this process.115 These new Russian citizens 
guaranteed that Russia would have a say in South Ossetian and Abkhazian politics. When Russia 
invaded Georgia in the 2008 war, this claim of protecting Russian citizens and the innocent 
South Ossetians and Abkhazians was used as validation.116  
Immediately after the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, Russia recognized the two regions as independent and established diplomatic ties on 
September 9, 2008.117 Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia established embassies in Moscow in late 
2008 and early 2009,118 while Russia has embassies in the capitals of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as well.   
Russia provided about 70 percent of Abkhazia’s 11.75-billion ruble ($179.3 million) 
2015 budget.119 Other than Russia’s direct financial support Abkhazia’s economy relies heavily 
on tourism, particularly Russian tourists, and a few cash crops like wine, tea, tobacco, fruit, and 
nuts that are, again, mostly exported to Russia.120  As discussed earlier, Russians support nearly 
all of Abkhazia’s tourist industry, and the close economic relationship between the two is 
unlikely to go away over a few cultural disagreements on clothing.  
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Relations between Abkhazia and Russia were strengthened in November 2014 when 
Russian President Putin and Abkhazian President Raul Khadzhimba signed the agreement On 
Alliance and Strategic Partnership. The agreement includes provisions for mutual defense, a 3-
year plan for the modernization of the Abkhazian army, establishment of a joint military force, 
building of defenses along Abkhazia’s border, increased aid for social programs (education, 
healthcare, pensions), and increasing pressure on other nations and international organizations to 
recognize Abkhazia’s independence. Abkhazia is also taking steps to become integrated in the 
Eurasian Economic Union that includes Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Although the 
agreement was largely supported in Abkhazia, the opposition party, Amtsakhara, protested 
against it for providing Russia with too much leverage in Abkhazia’s internal affairs. However, 
Amtsakhara does not oppose the provisions on defense, only those focused on economic 
integration. 121 
Unlike Abkhazia, which has the geographical position and resources for some economic 
development, South Ossetia has almost no sizeable investments or resources to grow 
economically. In recent years the Russian government has provided 90-99 percent of the 
republic’s budget, including all social services and pensions.122 As of February 2015, South 
Ossetia received over 91 percent of its 7.3-billion-ruble ($111.4 million) budget from Russia.123  
Ties between South Ossetia and Russia have increased since recognition in 2008 and 
have culminated in the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South 
Ossetia on Alliance and Integration signed on March 18, 2015. The agreement is similar to the 
one signed by Russia and Abkhazia in November 2014 and will expire in 25 years with the 																																																								
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possibility of ten-year extensions.124 The provisions of the document include the following:  
1. Greater cooperation in social sector, including raising pensions and public 
sector wages and establishing a compulsory insurance system, 
2. Simplifying the procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship, 
3. Establishing common defense and security space, integrate customs services, 
and allow for free movement across the interstate border for citizens 
4. Establishing the Interior Ministry Joint Coordination Centre to fight terrorism 
and organized crime, 
5. Beginning the Socioeconomic Development Investment Programme for 2015-2017 
with 9 billion rubles allocated for 36 projects in housing, culture and education, 
transport infrastructure, and a modern healthcare center in Tskhinvali.125 
 
This agreement has been largely criticized by the West for being seen as the effective annexation 
of South Ossetia. In fact, the agreement was signed on the one-year anniversary of the 
annexation of Crimea. The money, aid, programs, and partnerships outlined in the agreement 
shows Georgia and the rest of the world that Russia plans to continue their support of these 
regions as states. Russia is propping them up so that they have no need or desire to return to the 
Georgian administration. 
 While Russia has promised South Ossetia a lot of aid, corruption has been a major 
problem. Following the 2008 war, the majority of Russian aid promised to the region never 
reached the population. Of the $55 million in priority aid, only $1.4 million had been spent on 
reconstruction according to the Russian federal audit chamber. Approximately $33 million had 
been lost or misused, and 20 cases were opened against former officials who stole $22 million.126 
However, given that Russia funds nearly all of South Ossetia’s budget, the breakaway region 
does not have the luxury of turning down any money, no matter how corrupt the delivery 
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channels may be. 
 One aspect of life in South Ossetia and Abkhazia where Georgia has the upper hand over 
Russia is healthcare. Abkhazian ambulances run between Abkhazia and clinics in Zugdidi, 
Kutaisi, and Tbilisi when patients are critically ill. Officials are not supportive of the practice, 
but they have not tried to stop their residents from receiving medical attention. It would be 
difficult to defend a policy that negatively impacted the healthcare of citizens, and the Georgians 
understand this. The Georgian State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality Paata 
Zakareishvili said that there is no need to advertise this process because it is a humanitarian 
mission and residents from Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue to come despite obstacles.127  
South Ossetians go to Georgia to undergo medical treatment or complex surgery by 
traveling first to North Ossetia in Russia then entering Georgia at the Lars border checkpoint to 
the east of South Ossetia. South Ossetians are able to do this because they have Russian 
passports, which do not require Georgian visas. After making it through this border the people 
continue on to Tbilisi for treatment. Health facilities in South Ossetia and the North Caucasus in 
Russia are inferior to Georgia’s making it an attractive destination despite the amount of effort 
needed to make the journey. Furthermore, thanks to a Georgian policy put in place after 
Saakashvili left office, the treatment is free. Georgia pays the private hospitals that treat 
Ossetians from the annual budget. Zakareishvili stated in 2015 that the main goal of the program 
was for Ossetians to “continue to trust our program and receive substantial medical assistance in 
our clinics.” South Ossetian officials have criticized residents for pursuing healthcare in this 
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manner, but without attractive alternatives, South Ossetians continue to travel to Tbilisi.128 This 
approach from Georgia shows their efforts to serve their citizens despite the political differences 
that exist between the regions and Georgia. It is a smart way for Georgia to actively attract 
breakaway residents to Georgia and keep them away from Russia.  
Unlike Abkhazia, South Ossetian officials have never hidden their desire to join the 
Russian Federation. In September 2008, the South Ossetian president infamously greeted the 
Russian recognition of South Ossetia by saying, “we look forward to uniting with North Ossetia 
and joining the Russian Federation.”129 In December 2015, the South Ossetian President Leonid 
Tibilov told journalists that South Ossetia was planning a referendum to join Russia before the 
next presidential election in April 2017, while simultaneously proposing to rename the region the 
Republic of South Ossetia—Alania to match the Republic of North Ossetia—Alania. Tibilov 
went so far as to say that unifying North and South Ossetia was “the eternal dream of our entire 
people.”130 The two regions are already aligned in a number of ways, including their flags, which 
are different only in official dimensions.131  
It is highly unlikely that South Ossetia would move away from this position, but Moscow 
has been generally silent on the issue. North Ossetia is unenthusiastic about the two joining, with 
one official saying that it should not happen for another 15-20 years.132  Russia refuses to 
comment on the issue, because 1) there is no benefit to officially settling the dispute with 
Georgia by accepting South Ossetia into the federation, and 2) Russia already funds 90-99 
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percent of the region’s budget in addition to securing its borders. There is no strategic incentive 
for Russia to go any further in the acceptance of South Ossetia.  
 
 
V. Digital 
The Russian government understands the value of information and the power in 
controlling it, both inside and outside its borders. In what is often called “information wars,” 
Russia and other nations compete for supporters using all types of media. However, the largest 
area of growth and influence lies in television and the Internet.  While television is relatively 
straightforward to control via companies, the Internet is by nature far more elusive (assuming 
people have access). Russia’s strategy for control in the digital realm reflects an understanding of 
both categories, allowing the government to control the messages being sent to the breakaway 
regions.  
 
Television  
Most Russians get their news from television (85 percent), and the state controls nearly 
all the channels directly or indirectly.133 There are three main channels; Channel One and Russia 
One are popular federal channels while Gazprom, the state-controlled energy company, controls 
NTV. While these stations operate inside Russia, RT is the state-funded international English-
language satellite news that works to present “global news from a Russian perspective.” This 
perspective has become much more nationalistic since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis and 
annexation of Crimea.134 This nationalist viewpoint can be seen in programming like the 2015 																																																								
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release of a documentary film called Crimea: The Way Home, which includes an interview with 
President Putin justifying his actions during the crisis.135   
 
Ukraine 
In an effort to oppose one another, the Ukrainian government and Russia have restricted 
access to information via television. In the Russian- or separatist- controlled regions of Eastern 
Ukraine, pro-Ukrainian news outlets have been cut while Russian channels have been banned in 
the rest of Ukraine.136 According to Freedom House, 15 Russian channels were suspended for 
judicial review in Ukraine because they “incited hatred, threatened national security, or 
supported separatism.” In 2014 broadcasting control continuously flipped sides whenever 
territory changed hands. Even with all the fighting and political turmoil, Ukraine’s press freedom 
was upgraded from Not Free to Partly Free.137 Russia’s status remained Not Free and with its 
score becoming even worse than the year before. Freedom House explicitly cites the occupation 
of Crimea and involvement in Eastern Ukraine as a driving factor towards poorer press 
freedom.138  
 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
In Abkhazia, Russian or state-controlled television channels are the main sources of 
broadcast news, while access to Georgian television is rare and limited to satellite. Abkhazia has 																																																								
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one state-run television outlet that reaches all of Abkhazia and one private outlet, Abaza-TV, 
which is only accessible in the capital. The state channel broadcasts in both Russian and Abkhaz, 
and both sources are generally negative towards Georgia. While there are only two Abkhazian-
run channels, all of the major Russian channels are broadcasted in the region.139  
South Ossetia has similar restrictions on broadcasting. The government controls all local 
broadcasts and private ones are banned. OSInform is the news agency operated by the South 
Ossetian State Committee for TV and Radio Broadcasting.140 According to Freedom House, in 
2015 Russian and Georgian broadcasts were available, but is unclear what exactly is being 
viewed in the region.141 There is clearly limited exposure to other news sources giving Russian 
media a large amount of influence in both regions. Knowledge is power, and Russia currently 
dominates the news reaching Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
 
The Internet and Telecommunications 
The Russian Government has made the Internet a large priority in its efforts to control the 
media. As mentioned earlier, within Russia the government has created a blacklist of websites, 
restricting access for the nearly 87 million Russians using the Internet. Russia’s Federal Service 
for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications 
(Roskomnadzor) is the agency with the authority to “carry out permitting and licensing activities, 
validation and supervision in the spheres of telecommunications, information technologies and 
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mass communications.”142 As mentioned earlier, in 2013 VKontakte was briefly banned by the 
agency, supposedly because the owner refused to shut down online forums for opposition 
activists.143 Clearly within Russia, the government is doing everything it can to control citizens’ 
Internet usage. The government has also been supporting the idea of russkii mir or “Russian 
world” through the Internet by pushing for more domain names in the Cyrillic alphabet.144 This 
is an effort to unite Russian-speakers no matter where they are. In the breakaway regions, Russia 
is following a similar strategy of control by competing with Western news sources and supplying 
the regions with telecommunication support.  
 
Ukraine 
In Ukraine Russia’s approach includes what has become known as a “troll” army. Taia 
Global released a report last year that connected the Russian FSB to the practice. According to 
the report, Russia planned to use the Internet to gain influence and corrupt social media postings 
in Ukraine and Russia. The group creates fake accounts that post thousands of comments and 
articles to support the Russian position and criticize the Ukrainians.145 The BBC reported in 
March 2015 that the Internet Research Agency is a front for this army. Although some experts 
remain unconvinced that the Russian government would be successful in changing public 
																																																								
142 “Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass 
Communications (ROSKOMNADZOR).” Федеральной службы по надзору в сфере 
связи,информационных технологий и массовых коммуникаций. 3 March 2014. Web. 21 February 
2016. http://rkn.gov.ru/eng/   
143 “Top Russian Social Network Blacklisted By 'Mistake.'” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 24 May 
2013. Web. 21 February 2016.  http://www.rferl.org/content/vkontakte-blacklist-ban-russia-
mistake/24996067.html   
144 “Russia profile - Media.” 
145 “Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Internet Operations Against Ukraine.” TAIA Global, INC. 
2015. Web. 21 February 2016. https://taia.global/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/FSB-IO-UKRAINE.pdf  
	 56 
conscience, others believe that the real goal is to create confusion by filling the Internet with 
rumors and conspiracy theories.146  
Ukraine responded to these efforts by creating its own Internet army. Ukraine’s 
information minister Yuri Stec stated: 
Many fronts have opened against us, and one of the crucial ones is the information 
front… The war is real, and the information on it is false. Through this project, I hope we 
will have a lot of volunteers willing to distribute accurate information and expose 
Russian lies. 
 
The ministry set up a web site where anyone can sign up and receive tasks to complete on social 
media to promote Ukraine’s message.147 Essentially, Ukraine and Russia are both using fake 
accounts to promote their positions in the Ukrainian crisis. 
 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia  
Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have far less Internet traffic than Ukraine, but Russia 
exerts influence in these regions through the control of telecommunication companies. In 
Abkhazia Internet usage has grown to about 25%148 under two main companies, A-Mobile and 
Aquafon. Aquafon held a monopoly over Abkhazia until 2006 when Russian and Abkhaz 
businessmen established A-Mobile. Both carriers are headquartered in Sukhumi, the capital of 
Abkhazia, and largely serve Russian users traveling to the region due to the low rates of local 
users.149 Megafon, the second largest provider in Russia, bought Aquafon in 2009 by buying a 
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100% stake in Debton Investment Ltd., which holds 51% stakes in Aquafon and Ostelecom, the 
South Ossetian operator.150 As the only providers in the area, Russian businesses have full 
control of Abkhazia’s Internet and mobile access.  
 In South Ossetia, Megafon faced a fine from the Georgian National Communications 
Commission (GNCC) of roughly $350,000 for supplying unlicensed service to users in the 
region in 2008. The GNCC claimed that Megafon began expanding service in conjunction with 
the arrival of Russian military for the 2008 war, calling the company a political player for the 
Russian Government. As of October 2008, the fines had not been paid, and it can be assumed 
that they will never be paid given South Ossetia’s partially recognized political status.151 Further 
aggravating the Georgian government, in the summer of 2014 Russia’s Ministry of 
Communications signed a numbering agreement with South Ossetia to “to give numbering 
resources to South Ossetia for use until the region is handed its own separate international 
dialing code from the ITU.” The GNCC fired back by releasing a statement that South Ossetia is 
internationally recognized as a part of Georgia and cannot enter the ITU as independent with the 
government’s consent.152 It seems that Georgia and Russia these days are fighting in the legal 
realm of telecommunications more so than they are in physical confrontations. 
 Abkhazia and South Ossetia now have no choice but to rely on Russian 
telecommunications and network capabilities. These disputes with Georgia further establish 
Russia’s willingness to violate international law in all types of industries. The digital stage is 																																																								
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practically brand new to the region and will only become more important moving forward as 
Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia seek to modernize their societies. Russia has set itself up 
to be the master of this technology, undermining any efforts Georgia is making to remain 
connected to the regions.  
 
VI. Conclusions: Effectiveness of Russian Soft Power 
  
Russia understands the importance of using soft power to help achieve its goals in the 
region and further its global strategy. The government has used a great number of methods to do 
so, including efforts in culture, engagement, and digital categories. Russian soft power exists in a 
passive manner through language and history, but Russia also actively uses its soft power to both 
oppose other countries and convince populations in the breakaway regions. Often, its policies 
seek to do both at the same time. Russian soft power can be divided into four different divisions 
as shown in Table 2 below.    
Table 2: Russian Soft Power Categories 
 Convince (Breakaway Regions) Oppose (Ukraine and Georgia) 
Active 
• Financial Aid 
• Humanitarian Aid 
• State Recognition 
• Television 
• Music 
• Internet and Telecommunications 
• Eurovision Song Contest, Music 
• Internet and Telecommunications 
• Television  
Passive 
• Language in Eastern Ukraine 
• Tourism in Abkhazia and Crimea 
• Healthcare 
 
These examples demonstrate the wide range of soft power tools being employed by Russia. 
Notice that some examples can be listed in multiple divisions because the targets are different. 
Although we have identified a number of cases in which soft power is being employed, it 
is hard to determine whether or not the strategy has been effective. A number of resources, like 
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the Soft Power 30, seek to quantify soft power into a ranking system, but evaluating how soft 
power is affecting another state’s policies is tricky to identify. The first step in attempting this 
feat is to understand what State A wants State B to do. In these cases, what is Russia trying to 
achieve with its soft power tactics?  
Russia is pursuing a foreign policy in which it creates or enflames conflicts in 
neighboring countries for its own benefit. It is not a coincidence that Russia maintains military 
bases in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Transnistria where conflicts occur. Russia 
exacerbates tensions in these regions by supporting separatists, calling for their international 
recognition, and then giving aid to the breakaway governments. This is not just a pattern; it’s a 
formula for ensuring Russian importance in its historical sphere of influence.  
 Russia’s engagement of states in conflict serves a number of purposes. The first is that it 
hinders the ability of both Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO and the EU, thus leaving Russia’s 
sphere of influence and joining the West. Territorial integrity is essential for Georgia and 
Ukraine to become a member of these organizations, and since Russia supports breakaway 
territories, they cannot be reintegrated into their respective states. Therefore, Georgia and 
Ukraine cannot regain the land or make strong cases for membership in either group. Both 
organizations remain skeptical of Georgia and Ukraine joining and then drawing all the members 
into a larger conflict. NATO countries remain split on the issue of ascension for a number of 
reasons. Although countries like Montenegro have been invited to join NATO, Georgia remains 
without the essential NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) largely because not all countries in 
the alliance are prepared to defend Georgia in the event of another attack from Russia. While 
Georgian officials believe that NATO membership would grant security and stability, France, 
Germany, and other NATO countries think the exact opposite. This same argument can be 
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applied to Ukraine, which is now in almost the same position as Georgia.153 Admitting either 
country into NATO would be a clear statement that the alliance members would counter a 
Russian attack, but right now none of the allies are willing to face off against Russia.  
 Secondly, these conflicts distract their respective governments from being able to 
implement reform. According to Robert Orttung and Christopher Walker,  
“A basic prerequisite for democracy and democratic state-building is control over one’s 
territory. By undermining its neighbors’ territorial integrity, Russia seeks to distract the 
governments in Kiev, Kishinev (Moldova), and Tbilisi from successfully pursuing 
reforms to reduce corruption and build representative institutions. Instead of 
concentrating on improving their own governance, these disrupted countries must deal 
with the charged and emotional issues associated with territorial conflict.”154  
 
Resolving issues with Russia has been a top priority for the Georgian government, and in 2012 it 
led to the election of the Georgian Dream Coalition, which ran on the platform of improving 
relations with Russia. Instead of focusing on other domestic issues, the Georgian people and 
government turned much of their attention towards Russia and the breakaway regions. When 
asked in a survey in 2014, Georgians named “territorial integrity” as one of the top three national 
issues facing the country, and 42 percent said, “Russia was a real and existing threat to 
Georgia.”155 Likewise, the Ukrainian government has been engrossed in the implementation of 
the Minsk ceasefire agreed upon in 2015. Ukraine has no choice but to make the armed conflict 
its first priority, while it also struggles with numerous other problems like the economy.  
Thirdly, Russia is able to use these frozen conflicts as a buffer between itself and the 
West. Independence for each breakaway region is not the Russian goal, despite its rhetoric of 
supporting democracy. Rather, the deadlock in each country ensures that the West cannot expand 																																																								
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further, and Russia can use the regions as leverage in international decision-making. If a 
breakaway region were to gain full, internationally recognized independence or join Russia, the 
country it left would have an easier time joining the EU and NATO without a territorial issue. 
For example, in Ukraine, if the Donbass region joined Russia, then the Western side of Ukraine 
would more easily be able to pass a referendum to join either the EU or NATO, assuming NATO 
and the EU would accept the decision. In the end, Russia would extend its borders, but only to be 
next to an even more western-leaning country that does not behave as Moscow wishes. By 
keeping Ukraine and Georgia’s breakaway regions in a liminal status internationally, Russia is 
able to keep Ukraine and Georgia as buffers between itself and the encroaching West. 
Finally, Russia uses these countries and regions to prove its might and political 
importance. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia lost its ability to effectively push its 
agenda, and the United States rose as a global hegemon. Through renewed conflict and 
involvement, Russia flexes its military power and soft power, and is able to once again affect 
international policy. Both large and small actions in Georgia and Ukraine are used to remind the 
West that Russia is still important and in control of the region. Western countries cannot make 
advances in allegiances with Georgia and Ukraine without first considering how Russia would 
respond. That is exactly what Russia wants. Russia does not necessarily need or want to have 
direct control over more territory or rebuild an empire, but it wants to have big seat at the table 
when international decisions are made.  
 So, is Russian soft power the force keeping these regions and countries under Russian 
influence? It depends on the intended audience and purpose of the message. Russian soft power 
that opposes international targets, like Ukraine and Georgia, has been largely effective, because 
these governments have acknowledged that Russian soft power is being used and must be 
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countered. Even if Russian soft power is not effective at changing policy in the breakaway 
regions, its soft power is getting a large amount of publicity internationally. Other states believe 
that it is important enough to discuss, which, according to Jason Parker, means that it is working. 
In other words, soft power works as long as others believe that it works.156 While Russia pours 
money, time, and effort into remaining relevant in the international system, Ukraine and Georgia 
are doing the same in their efforts to counter Russian influence. Opposing Russian soft power 
has become a priority. In the Georgian President’s State of the State address in 2015, he directly 
referenced the issue saying, “Georgia is one of the targets of Russia’s global propaganda-
ideological campaign. The essence of this campaign is to divert Georgia from European and 
Euro-Atlantic choice through so called ‘soft power’,” and that “consolidation of pro-western 
agenda within the country is required in order to [repel] this attack.”157 Neither Georgia nor 
Ukraine has been able to join NATO or the EU due to these frozen conflicts and perceived soft 
power attacks by Russia.  
The biggest issue facing Russian soft power today is deciding how much money and 
political capital can be spent maintaining their hold in these regions. For example, consider the 
differences between Russian actions in Crimea versus Abkhazia. In 2008, Russia was on the 
verge of taking complete control of Tbilisi and Georgia but withdrew. Not only did Russia 
withdraw, but also it did not annex Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Instead it established the two as 
independent countries. It is true that Russia has effectively annexed the regions, but the lack of an 
official declaration is important, because Crimea was officially annexed by Russia in 2014. This 
																																																								
156 As Jason Parker discussed in his lecture, “Hearts, Minds, Voices: Cold War Public Diplomacy and the 
Formation of the 'Third World’,” at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies on February 29, 
2016. 
157 “In State of Nation Address, President Asks Who is in Charge.” Civil.ge. 31 March 2015. Web. 12 
April 2015. http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28174  
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nuance tells us that Russia did not deem it worthwhile enough to officially take control of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia like it did Crimea. Why?  
 The Crimean people are much more closely aligned with Russia in terms of language, 
ethnicity, and culture than Abkhazia or South Ossetia. This is where passive soft power plays a 
large role. Crimea did not push for independence from Ukraine as Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
did from Georgia in the 1990s and 2008. Instead, Crimea held a referendum to immediately join 
Russia.  Whether or not the referendum was representative of the Crimean people’s wishes is a 
matter of debate for another paper. The point here is that Crimea never wanted to be a 
completely independent country so the political cost to annexing the region was much lower than 
the cost of annexing regions that had pushed for independence for a number of years. Even 
though the West condemned the annexation and placed sanctions on Russian businessmen, most 
of the ordinary Russian citizens approved of the move based on the perceived desires of the 
Crimean people. This would have been a far more difficult case to make for official annexation 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008.  
 Russian soft power is more limited in the breakaway regions. Eastern Ukraine and South 
Ossetia have expressed their desires to join the Russian Federation, but the Russian Government 
has refrained from accepting them, because it does not further its overall strategy. Russia’s 
indifferent posture could negatively affect the opinion of the populations in these regions. 
Furthermore, the amount of aid that Russia says it is providing does not always reach the 
population due to corruption. People have been stuck trying to survive paycheck-to-paycheck or 
forced to travel great distances to receive healthcare, because modern clinics are not available. 
This is hardly a good way for Russia to garner support for its policies. Abkhazia’s situation is a 
little different than South Ossetia and Ukraine, because the breakaway region has never 
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expressed a serious desire to join Russia. The Abkhazians have always sought independence, and 
view Russian support as the means to that end.  
 At this point, there is no reason for Russia to abandon its soft power strategy, because it 
has helped keep the West from coming too close to Russia’s borders. While the people in the 
breakaway regions may not be convinced of Russia’s power, the international community is 
certainly paying more attention to Russia’s moves off the battlefield. Russia has successfully 
opposed the West. 
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